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A CRACK IN THE ARMOR?:  HOW THE 
REFORMS TO THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW MAY EXPOSE WEAKNESSES IN 
CIVIL RAPE SHIELD LAWS 
Candace Mashel* 
 
Civil rape shield laws exist to protect victims of sexual misconduct from 
unwarranted intrusions into their private lives as they litigate their claims.  
Gaps in current federal and New York State civil rape shield laws, however, 
mean that victims of sexual misconduct still experience significant privacy 
intrusions during litigation.  These intrusions may have the effect of deterring 
victims from coming forward.  Part of the reason that these gaps exist, 
however, is to ensure that defendants are given a fair opportunity to assert 
defenses. 
In 2019, New York revised the New York State Human Rights Law to make 
it easier for victims to bring sexual harassment claims.  The revisions 
included the elimination of two commonly asserted defenses to sexual 
harassment claims.  The defenses that survived the revisions, however, may 
force defendants to probe into plaintiffs’ private sexual histories more than 
was necessary when more defenses were available.  The reforms to the New 
York State Human Rights Law, therefore, may have the unintended 
consequence of increasing the use of tactics that deter victims from coming 
forward. 
This Note argues that New York should enact a civil rape shield statute to 
better protect the privacy of sexual harassment plaintiffs, without further 
limiting the defenses available to sexual harassment defendants, and 
proposes the appropriate mechanisms for doing so. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“In July of 2013, I was raped by Charles Payne . . . .  In July of 2017, I was 
raped again by Fox News.  Since then, I have been living an absolute hell.”1  
These are the words of a woman who filed a sexual harassment claim against 
Charles Payne and Fox News.2  In response to her allegations, Fox News 
employed a tactic frequently used by sexual harassment defendants, known 
colloquially as the “she’s crazy” or “she wanted it” defense.3  This strategy 
seeks to shift the blame from the accused to the accuser.4  Fox News leaked 
a story to the media about an affair between the plaintiff and Mr. Payne,5 
claimed that the plaintiff pursued a sexual relationship with Mr. Payne to 
advance her career,6 and sought sexual videos and photographs of the 
plaintiff from men with whom the plaintiff had previously had romantic 
relationships.7  These tactics can be traumatizing for victims8 of sexual 
harassment who are brave enough to come forward9 and may deter others 
from coming forward at all.10  New York State recently revised article 15 of 
the Executive Law, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), to 
make it “easier for workplace sexual harassment claims to be brought 
forward.”11  But are the revisions enough to combat the deterrent effects of 
the “she’s crazy” and “she wanted it” defenses? 
 
 1. Emily Steel, Woman Says Fox News Banned Her After She Accused Charles Payne of 
Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/business/media/ 
fox-news-lawsuit-charles-payne.html [https://perma.cc/R2AZ-FJ4W]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Symposium, 2018 Symposium Panel Discussion:  Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace in the #MeToo Era, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 45, 50 (2019); infra Part II.A.1. 
 4. See Symposium, supra note 3, at 50. 
 5. See Steel, supra note 1. 
 6. See Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 327 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 7. See id. at 56–57; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to 
Quash the Fox Defendants’ Non-Party Subpoenas Duces Tecum at 3, Hughes, 327 F.R.D. 55 
(No. 17-cv-7093(WHP)), ECF No. 38 [hereinafter Hughes Memorandum]. 
 8. This Note uses the term “victim,” rather than “survivor,” to refer to individuals who 
have experienced sexual harassment because the term “victim” is used in the legal literature 
and statutes concerning sexual harassment. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412.  In addition, the term 
“victim” may capture the diverse range of experiences of individuals who have been sexually 
harassed. See Danielle Campoamor, Opinion, I’m Not a Sexual Assault “Survivor”—I’m a 
Victim, HARPER’S BAZAAR (May 21, 2018), https://www.harpersbazaar.com/ 
culture/features/a20138398/stop-using-survivor-to-describe-sexual-assault-victims/ [https:// 
perma.cc/A7ZJ-9H3W] (“‘Survivor’ isn’t indicative of how I feel on any given day.”).  This 
Note also uses the terms “victim” and “plaintiff” interchangeably. 
 9. See Symposium, supra note 3, at 50. 
 10. See Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs’ Sexual Pasts:  Coping with Preconceptions 
Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559, 562–63 (2002); Catherine A. O’Neill, Comment, 
Sexual Harassment Cases and the Law of Evidence:  A Proposed Rule, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 219, 232 n.48. 
 11. See Dan M. Clark, Sweeping Reform of NY Sexual Harassment Law Is Signed by Gov. 
Cuomo, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/12/ 
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This Note examines how current rape shield laws fail to adequately protect 
sexual harassment plaintiffs in a manner that undermines the aims of the 
recent revisions to the NYSHRL and how the revisions themselves may 
inadvertently exacerbate this issue.  Part I discusses the development of rape 
shield laws to protect victims of sexual misconduct in both criminal and civil 
cases before detailing the recent changes to the NYSHRL.  Part II examines 
(1) the ways in which New York’s current rape shield jurisprudence fails to 
adequately protect sexual harassment plaintiffs and (2) how these failures 
persist beyond the NYSHRL reforms—and ultimately undermine the 
purpose of the reforms.  Part II also addresses the legitimate reasons why a 
sexual harassment defendant might seek evidence regarding a plaintiff’s 
sexual history or predisposition, especially in light of the reforms.  Part III 
then proposes that New York should develop its own civil rape shield statute 
to better protect the privacy interests of sexual harassment plaintiffs without 
infringing on the ability of sexual harassment defendants to defend 
themselves. 
I.  TWO SIDES OF THE SAME SHIELD:  PROTECTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
VICTIMS THROUGH RAPE SHIELD LAWS AND CIVIL RIGHTS REFORMS 
This Part discusses the development and current state of civil rape shield 
laws and also describes the NYSHRL reforms.  Part I.A discusses the 
development of the federal rape shield law, its expansion to civil cases, and 
its application in civil cases.  Part I.B then explains New York State’s civil 
rape shield jurisprudence.  Finally, Part I.C details the NYSHRL reforms. 
A.  The Federal Rape Shield Law 
Criminal rape shield laws protect the victims in prosecutions involving sex 
offenses.12  These laws shield victims of sex offenses by preventing a 
defendant from revealing details about a victim’s past sexual conduct.13  The 
general purpose of these laws is to protect victims from unnecessary 
intrusions of privacy.14 
Prior to the enactment of rape shield laws, it was common practice for 
criminal defendants to present evidence regarding a victim’s prior sexual 
conduct during trial.15  Admitting such evidence, however, misdirected the 
focus of the case and resulted in unnecessary intrusions into the private lives 
of the victims.16  In addition, this practice discouraged victims from coming 




 12. See 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). 
 13. See id.  This Note uses the terms “sexual conduct,” “sexual history,” “sexual 
predisposition,” and “sexual behavior” interchangeably. See infra notes 30–32 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. See O’Neill, supra note 10, at 219. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. at 225. 
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value and may result in prejudice to the victims,18 Congress enacted Federal 
Rule of Evidence 412 (“Rule 412”) to protect victims of rape from 
unwarranted intrusions into their private lives.19 
Rule 412 makes evidence of victims’ sexual history presumptively 
inadmissible.20  However, because the Constitution grants criminal 
defendants the right to present evidence and confront witnesses, Rule 412 
allows admission of sexual history evidence in criminal cases in certain 
express circumstances.21 
1.  Expanding the Federal Rape Shield Law to Civil Cases 
In 1994, over ten years after the enactment of Rule 412, Congress extended 
federal rape shield protections to civil plaintiffs.22  Like that of the original 
rule, the purpose of extending Rule 412 to civil cases was to narrow the 
inquiry, protect plaintiffs’ privacy, and encourage victims to come forward 
with civil rape or sexual harassment claims.23  Rule 412 aims to safeguard 
victims in sex offense cases “against the invasion of privacy, potential 
embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with the public 
disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into 
the factfinding process.”24  These protections are meant to encourage 
“victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal 
proceedings against alleged offenders.”25  As in the criminal context, Rule 
412 now makes sexual history evidence presumptively inadmissible in civil 
cases.26 
2.  Applying the Federal Rape Shield Law in Civil Cases 
Courts conduct a two-step analysis in determining whether evidence 
sought to be introduced by the defendant is admissible in civil cases pursuant 
to Rule 412.27  During the first stage of the analysis, the court determines 
whether Rule 412 applies to the type of evidence in question.28  Rule 412 
governs the admissibility of two types of evidence, namely “(1) evidence 
offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) 
 
 18. See id. at 224–25; see also Patrick J. Hines, Note, Bracing the Armor:  Extending Rape 
Shield Protections to Civil Proceedings, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 883 (2011). 
 19. See O’Neill, supra note 10, at 219. 
 20. See FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (prohibiting sexual history evidence in the first instance but 
allowing for its admission pursuant to certain exceptions). 
 21. See Hines, supra note 18, at 884. 
 22. See Laura E. Diss, Note, Whether You “Like” It or Not:  The Inclusion of Social Media 
Evidence in Sexual Harassment Cases and How Courts Can Effectively Control It, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 1841, 1859 (2013). 
 23. See id. at 1859–60. 
 24. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. r. 412(a). 
 27. See Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2000) (determining, first, that the 
evidence at issue was subject to Rule 412 and then that the evidence at issue was inadmissible 
pursuant to the Rule’s criteria). 
 28. See id. 
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evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.”29  The advisory 
committee’s notes establish that “sexual behavior” refers to all activities that 
involve actual physical conduct, such as sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact.30  The terms “sexual predisposition” and “sexual behavior” are 
meant to be interpreted broadly, however, and may also encompass such 
evidence as “‘fantasies or dreams,’ ‘use of contraceptives,’ the ‘birth of an 
illegitimate child,’ and evidence that ‘may have a sexual connotation for the 
factfinder,’ even if such evidence ‘does not directly refer to sexual activities 
or thoughts.’”31  The term “sexual predisposition” also refers to evidence 
“relating to the alleged victim’s mode of dress, speech, or life-style.”32  If the 
court determines that the evidence sought to be admitted by the defendant 
fits into either of these two categories, then Rule 412 applies and the evidence 
is presumptively inadmissible.33  If the evidence does not fit into either of 
these two categories, however, then the evidence is governed by Federal Rule 
of Evidence 403, and the evidence will be presumed admissible, unless the 
plaintiff can justify its exclusion.34 
If the court determines that Rule 412 applies, it proceeds to the second 
stage of analysis.35  During this stage, the court will determine whether to 
override the presumption of inadmissibility.36  The evidence in question will 
be deemed admissible if “its probative value substantially outweighs the 
danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”37  This 
balancing test is a fact-dependent inquiry and whether the evidence in 
question is deemed admissible will vary from case to case.38 
 
 29. FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 30. id. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
 31. Glazier v. Fox, No. 2014-106, 2016 WL 827760, at *4 (D.V.I. Mar. 2, 2016) (quoting 
FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment). 
 32. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
 33. See Wolak, 217 F.3d at 160. 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment (explaining that 
Rule 412 “reverses that usual procedure spelled out in Rule 403 by shifting the burden to the 
proponent to demonstrate admissibility rather than making the opponent justify exclusion of 
the evidence”). 
 35. See Wolak, 217 F.3d at 160. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)).  This reverses the usual presumption that 
relevant evidence is admissible and will be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. See Chamblee v. Harris & Harris, Inc., 154 F. 
Supp. 2d 670, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).  The exceptions to the 
presumptive inadmissibility of sexual history evidence are different in the civil context than 
they are in the criminal context. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)–(2).  In the criminal context, Rule 
412 precludes the admission of plaintiffs’ past sexual conduct or predisposition except in 
certain expressly delineated circumstances. See Aiken, supra note 10, at 560.  In the civil 
context, however, Rule 412 grants the court the discretion to determine “whether the probative 
value of the proffered evidence substantially outweighs the prejudice to a party or the harm to 
the victim.” Id. 
 38. See Aiken, supra note 10, at 585.  Note that Rule 412 governs the admissibility of 
evidence at trial, whereas Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the 
discovery of evidence. See Holt v. Welch Allyn, Inc., No. 95–CV–1135 (RSP/GJD), 1997 WL 
210420, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997).  The standard governing the admissibility of evidence 
pursuant to Rule 412 is narrower than the standard governing the discoverability of evidence 
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B.  New York State’s Civil Rape Shield Jurisprudence 
New York does not have its own statutory code of evidence.39  Instead, 
New York derives its evidence rules from judicial decisions, statutes, and 
court rules.40  While New York’s penal code does include a criminal rape 
shield statute,41 the state’s civil rape shield jurisprudence is not very 
developed.42  In determining the admissibility of sexual history evidence in 
civil cases, New York courts have, therefore, looked to federal case law for 
guidance.43  In Bumpus v. New York City Transit Authority,44 for example, 
the Kings County Supreme Court cited a federal district court case that 
applied Rule 412 and set forth “the standard” that “[i]n a sexual harassment 
case, evidence offered to prove the plaintiff’s sexual behavior generally is 
inadmissible unless its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of 
harm to the victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”45  In Bumpus, the 
plaintiff, a transgender woman, sued the New York City Transit Authority 
under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), alleging that she 
had been verbally harassed by a transit employee.46  The plaintiff alleged that 
the harassment had caused emotional distress, which negatively affected her 
relationship with her partner.47  The defendants deposed the plaintiff’s 
partner and inquired about his sexual orientation and the types of sexual acts 
in which he and the plaintiff had engaged.48  Applying “the standard” from 
federal case law, the court held that this line of questioning was 
impermissible and that “[a]ny probative value of the proposed inquiry . . . 
 
pursuant to Rule 26. See Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 327 F.R.D. 55, 58 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Rule 26’s relevance requirement permits the discovery of information that 
‘need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence.’” (quoting Montesa v. Schwartz, No. 12 Civ. 6057 
(CS)(JCM), 2015 WL 13016354, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2015))).  However, in order to carry 
out the purpose of Rule 412, courts tend to restrict discovery to prohibit inquiry into areas that 
will not survive the Rule 412 balancing test. See id.; Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 
132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996). 
 39. See William C. Donnino, New York’s Evidence Guide:  The Court System’s ‘Best Kept 
Secret,’ N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/09/10/ 
new-yorks-evidence-guide-the-court-systems-best-kept-secret/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6N2H-H7J5]. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 2020). 
 42. See Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 3512/07, 2009 WL 1141401, at *3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009) (noting that “[n]either the parties nor the Court were able to find New 
York State precedent addressing the issue” of whether the defense could inquire about the 
sexual orientation and sexual activities of a third-party witness in a transgender discrimination 
case). 
 43. See id.; see also Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 49 N.Y.S.3d 690, 692 (App. Div. 
2017) (citing Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 44. No. 3512/07, 2009 WL 1141401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009). 
 45. Id. at *3 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. QVC, Inc., No. 98-CV-38156, 1999 WL 1215577, at 
*2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1999)). 
 46. See id. at *1. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
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[was] far outweighed by the invasion of this non-party witness’ privacy 
interest as well as the possible prejudicial impact of such testimony.”49 
Similarly, in Rivera v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,50 the Bronx County 
Supreme Court cited several federal court of appeals decisions in holding that 
“private sexual relationships are essentially irrelevant in sexual harassment 
cases, and that a plaintiff’s private sexual behavior does not change his or her 
expectations or entitlement to a workplace free of sexual harassment.”51  In 
Rivera, the plaintiff sued her employer, United Parcel Service (UPS), for 
sexual harassment under NYCHRL.52  In preparing its defense, UPS sought 
information about the plaintiff’s consensual sexual relationship with a 
coworker that took place after the plaintiff’s employment had been 
terminated.53  The court held that this evidence was inadmissible, quoting a 
Second Circuit decision for the proposition that the welcomeness54 of a 
sexual advance “does not turn on the private sexual behavior of the alleged 
victim, because a woman’s expectations about her work environment cannot 
be said to change depending upon her sexual sophistication.”55 
C.  The NYSHRL Reforms 
In August 2019, New York State made several sweeping changes to the 
NYSHRL, which reformed the state’s sexual harassment laws.56  Spurred by 
“dozens of high profile incidents” and the #MeToo57 and Time’s Up58 
movements, the justification for these reforms was to “abandon the 
protection of those who would discriminate and sexually harass in the 
workplace and recognize and serve victims of discrimination.”59 
 
 49. Id. at *4. 
 50. No. 303092/2008, 2015 WL 13345524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2015), aff’d, 49 
N.Y.S.3d 690 (App. Div. 2017). 
 51. Id. at *4 n.3. 
 52. Verified Complaint at 12, Rivera, 2015 WL 13345524 (No. 303092/2008). 
 53. Rivera, 2015 WL 13345524, at *4 n.3. 
 54. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 55. Rivera, 2015 WL 13345524, at *4 n.3 (quoting Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160 
(2d Cir. 2000)). 
 56. See Clark, supra note 11. 
 57. The #MeToo movement is a social justice initiative against sexual assault and 
harassment that was originally created in 1997, as the “Me Too” movement, by Tarana Burke. 
See Nora Stewart, Note, The Light We Shine into the Grey:  A Restorative #MeToo Solution 
and an Acknowledgment of Those #MeToo Leaves in the Dark, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1693, 
1698 n.18 (2019).  The initiative was renewed in 2017, as the “#MeToo” movement, in the 
wake of widespread publicity regarding film producer Harvey Weinstein’s long history of 
predatory behavior toward women. See id. at 1698; see also Pooja Bhaskar, Note, Milkovich, 
#MeToo, and “Liars”:  Defamation Law and the Fact-Opinion Distinction, 88 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 691, 693 n.2 (2019). 
 58. The “Time’s Up” movement is a social justice initiative that was formed in 2018 by 
female actors, agents, writers, directors, producers, and entertainment executives to fight 
systemic sexual harassment in the entertainment industry as well as in blue-collar workplaces 
nationwide. See Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-harassment Action 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-up-
hollywood-women-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/8A6S-ABV4]. 
 59. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, Assemb. 08421, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted). 
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The NYSHRL reforms made a number of important changes to the state’s 
sexual harassment laws.  To make it “easier for workplace sexual harassment 
claims to be brought forward,” the New York State Legislature (1) eliminated 
the “severe or pervasive” standard traditionally required to sustain a sexual 
harassment claim;60 (2) removed the Faragher-Ellerth defense as an 
affirmative defense;61 and (3) expanded the definition of employer to include 
all employers regardless of size.62  Parts I.C.1 though I.C.3 discuss each of 
these reforms, respectively. 
1.  Eliminating the Severe or Pervasive Standard 
Prior to the NYSHRL reforms, New York followed Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 196463 (“Title VII”) in requiring harassing conduct to be 
“severe or pervasive” in order to be actionable.64  Under that standard, courts 
look at the frequency and severity of the harassing conduct to determine 
whether the plaintiff has an actionable sexual harassment claim.65  To be 
sufficiently severe, the conduct at issue must be “physically threatening or 
humiliating” as opposed to “a mere offensive utterance,” and it must 
unreasonably interfere with the plaintiff’s work performance.66  If not 
sufficiently severe, the conduct at issue must be sufficiently pervasive to be 
actionable.67  To be sufficiently pervasive, the conduct must be “more than 
episodic,”68 must be “sufficiently continuous and concerted,”69 and must be 
“repeated.”70  “[I]solated acts or occasional episodes will not merit relief.”71 
 
 60. See Clark, supra note 11. 
 61. See id. (noting that employers will still be able to offer the Faragher-Ellerth defense, 
but it will no longer be determinative). 
 62. See Russell Penzer, New York Breaks from Federal Sexual Harassment Standards, 
N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/10/04/new-york-
breaks-from-federal-sexual-harassment-standards/ [https://perma.cc/2EGH-VE9R]. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018). 
 64. See Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30 (App. Div. 2009) (affirming 
the decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s NYSHRL claim on the basis that it was not sufficiently 
severe or pervasive); Palmer v. Cook, 108 N.Y.S.3d 297, 311 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (noting that a 
plaintiff must show that the alleged conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment” to state a 
claim under the NYSHRL for sexual harassment (quoting Jones v. Mayflower Int’l Hotel Grp., 
Inc., No. 15-CVJ4435 (WFK), 2018 WL 3999586, at *6 (E.D.N.Y July 3, 2018))).  Title VII 
requires the harassing conduct to be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions 
of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 
897 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 65. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he required showing of 
severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or 
frequency of the conduct.”); Palmer, 108 N.Y.S.3d at 311. 
 68. Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 71. Id. 
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The “severe or pervasive” standard does not capture a broad range of 
conduct that falls between what might be considered “severe or pervasive” 
and what might be considered a “petty slight or trivial inconvenience.”72  
This high bar makes it difficult for sexual harassment plaintiffs to prevail on 
their claims.73  In one case, for example, a circuit court held that three isolated 
incidents over the course of nine months were not sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to establish actionable harassment.74  In this case, the plaintiff’s 
harasser:  asked the plaintiff to watch pornographic movies and masturbate; 
suggested that the plaintiff would advance professionally if he caused the 
harasser to orgasm; kissed the plaintiff on the mouth; grabbed the plaintiff’s 
buttocks; brushed the plaintiff’s groin; reached for the plaintiff’s genitals; 
and gripped the plaintiff’s thigh.75 
The revised NYSHRL proscribes harassment “regardless of whether such 
harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied 
to harassment claims.”76  In abandoning the “severe or pervasive” standard, 
the revised NYSHRL makes it an affirmative defense “that the harassing 
conduct does not rise above the level of what a reasonable victim of 
discrimination with the same protected characteristic would consider petty 
slights or trivial inconveniences.”77  This “petty slights or trivial 
inconveniences” standard, a lower standard than the “severe or pervasive” 
standard, is applied under NYCHRL.78  The “petty slights or trivial 
inconveniences” standard is intended to capture the “broad range of conduct 
that falls between ‘severe or pervasive’ on the one hand and a ‘petty slight or 
trivial inconvenience’ on the other.”79  Therefore, a broader range of conduct 
is actionable under the revised NYSHRL than was actionable under the prior 
NYSHRL or is actionable under federal law. 
2.  Eliminating the Faragher-Ellerth Defense 
Prior to the NYSHRL reforms, New York also followed federal Title VII 
jurisprudence by making the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense available 
to employers in sexual harassment cases.80  The Faragher-Ellerth defense 
 
 72. See Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 41 (App. Div. 2009). 
 73. See id. at 36 (“The rule (and its misapplication) has routinely barred the courthouse 
door to women who have, in fact, been treated less well than men because of gender.”); Sandra 
F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Opinion, Boss Grab Your Breasts?:  That’s Not (Legally) 
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/ 
opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html [https://perma.cc/6HFD-R43Q]; see also Deborah 
L. Rhode, #MeToo:  Why Now?:  What Next?, 69 DUKE L.J., 377, 385 n.38 (2019) (collecting 
cases). 
 74. See LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir. 
2005). 
 75. See id. at 1100. 
 76. Assemb. 08421, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 41. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 928 N.E.2d 1035, 1039 (N.Y. 2010) (noting that the 
NYCHRL, unlike the NYSHRL at that time, precluded the application of the Faragher-Ellerth 
defense); Poolt v. Brooks, No. 110024/09, 2013 WL 323253, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 
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applied when the employer could be held vicariously liable for the sexual 
harassment conduct committed by the employer’s supervisory employee81 
that did not result in the victim suffering a tangible employment action.82  In 
those cases, if the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and rectify 
any sexual harassment conduct and the plaintiff-employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of the corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or failed to otherwise avoid harm, then the employer could avoid 
vicarious liability.83  The employer could exercise reasonable care by, for 
example, maintaining an antiharassment policy with a complaint 
procedure.84  The plaintiff would be said to have unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of the corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to 
otherwise avoid harm if, for example, the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use 
the employer’s complaint procedure.85  Therefore, under the prior NYSHRL, 
an employer could completely avoid liability for sexual harassment 
committed by a supervisory employee merely by establishing an 
antiharassment policy with a complaint procedure, if the alleged victim failed 
to report the harassment using that procedure.86  Under the revised NYSHRL, 
however, the fact that an employee did not report sexual harassment through 
the employer’s complaint procedure “shall not be determinative” of whether 
the employer may be held liable.87  Therefore, it will be more difficult for 
sexual harassment defendants to avoid liability under the revised NYSHRL 
than under the prior New York or federal law. 
3.  Expanding the Definition of Employer 
The NYSHRL reforms expanded the definition of employer to include all 
employers regardless of size.88  Prior to the reforms, the NYSHRL excluded 
employers with fewer than four employees from its definition of employer.89  
Similarly, Title VII does not apply to employers who have fewer than fifteen 
 
2013) (“Under federal and state law, an employer vicariously liable for the discriminatory 
conduct of a managerial or supervisory employee may elude liability by asserting the so-called 
Faragher-Ellerth defense.”). 
 81. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 744 (1998).  A supervisory employee 
is an employee “empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the 
victim.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). 
 82. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.  A tangible employment action is “a significant change 
in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” 
See id. at 761. 
 83. See id. at 745. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Many victims of sexual harassment refrain from reporting misconduct through 
internal complaint procedures because of fear of retaliation and because of inadequate 
protections against retaliation. See Kate W. Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure:  
The Lessons of Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 463, 
477–88 (2018). 
 87. Assemb. 08421, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted). 
 88. See Penzer, supra note 62. 
 89. See Assemb. 08421. 
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employees.90  Therefore, under the revised NYSHRL, plaintiffs will be able 
to pursue claims against employers who could not be sued under the prior 
law and cannot be sued under Title VII. 
II.  HOW THE NYSHRL REFORMS MAY EXPOSE GAPS IN THE CIVIL 
RAPE SHIELD LAWS AND WHY THOSE GAPS MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO 
FIX  
The purpose of civil rape shield laws is to protect alleged victims of sexual 
misconduct from the “invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and 
sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate 
sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding 
process” and to encourage “victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to 
participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.”91  Rule 412 and 
New York common law seek to achieve these objectives in civil cases by 
barring evidence offered to prove the alleged victim’s sexual behavior or 
sexual predisposition, unless the probative value of such evidence 
significantly outweighs the possible harm to the victim.92  Despite these laws, 
however, many plaintiffs in civil sexual misconduct cases continue to 
experience invasions of privacy as their claims are litigated.93  To that end, 
Part II.A examines how gaps in Rule 412 and New York’s civil rape shield 
jurisprudence prevent sexual harassment plaintiffs from securing full 
protection.  Part II.B then discusses why these shortcomings may be 
unavoidable if defendants are to be given a fair trial.  Finally, Part II.C 
examines how the NYSHRL reforms might exacerbate the dueling interests 
of (1) fully protecting sexual harassment plaintiffs from privacy invasions in 
order to encourage victims to come forward and (2) providing sexual 
harassment defendants with a fair trial. 
A.  How Current Rape Shield Laws Fail to Adequately Protect Sexual 
Harassment Victims 
This section discusses how gaps in current rape shield laws fail to 
adequately protect sexual harassment victims.  Part II.A.1 discusses how the 
shortcomings of Rule 412 prevent sexual harassment plaintiffs from securing 
full protection.  Part II.A.2 discusses how the shortcomings of New York’s 
civil rape shield common law prevent sexual harassment plaintiffs from 
securing full protection. 
 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018). 
 91. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. 
 92. See id.; Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 3512/07, 2009 WL 1141401, at *3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009) (citing Fitzpatrick v. QVC, Inc., No. 98–CV–3815, 1999 WL 1215577, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1999)). 
 93. See infra Part II.A. 
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1.  The Weaknesses of Rule 412 
In Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.,94 the plaintiff, a female guest 
television contributor, sued Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. (Fox) and 
Charles Payne, among others, under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the 
NYCHRL.95  The crux of the plaintiff’s allegations was that Mr. Payne had 
sexually harassed her.96  The defendants argued that the plaintiff and Mr. 
Payne had had a consensual relationship and that this relationship was 
consistent with the plaintiff’s history of pursuing conservative media figures 
and politicians who she believed could advance her career.97  To bolster this 
defense, the defendants subpoenaed four men formerly involved in affairs 
with the plaintiff, seeking evidence of the plaintiff’s purported pattern of 
pursuing men to boost her career.98  The subpoenas sought “sexual or 
romantic communications between [the plaintiff] and each of the men, 
information regarding [the plaintiff’s] personal background and reputation, 
and media files of a sexual or romantic nature depicting [the plaintiff].”99  In 
response, the plaintiff moved to quash the subpoenas, arguing that none of 
the subpoenaed men had ever been employees of Fox; they did not have any 
information pertaining to the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant; and the 
real, and only, purpose of the subpoenas was to harass, humiliate, and punish 
the plaintiff.100 
Applying Rule 412, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to quash the 
subpoenas, concluding that “the prejudice arising from [the plaintiff’s] prior 
sexual history with other men would outweigh what little relevance [such 
evidence] may bring to [the] case.”101  The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s 
sexual relationships with nonparties who had no connection to claims of the 
case would distract the parties, as well as a jury, from the real issues in the 
case.102  Further, the court noted that the “[d]efendants’ purported strategy is 
superficially appealing, but advances a boorish, reductive narrative that [the 
plaintiff] was predisposed to engaging in self-serving sexual relationships” 
and that the plaintiff’s “prior sexual history [had] no relevance to her claims 
against [Mr.] Payne, or [to] the defense that she used [Mr.] Payne to advance 
her career at Fox.”103 
In Hughes, the plaintiff successfully invoked Rule 412 to block the 
defendants from obtaining, among other things, “[s]exual or romantic 
communications” between the plaintiff and “persons other than her husband” 
and “[v]ideos, audios or photos” of the plaintiff “of a sexual or romantic 
 
 94. 327 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 95. See id. at 57; Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2. 
 96. See Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1. 
 97. See Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 57; see also Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1. 
 98. See Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 57. 
 99. Id. at 56–57. 
 100. See Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1. 
 101. Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 58. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. 
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nature” from third parties.104  In that respect, Rule 412 achieved its purpose 
by protecting the plaintiff from the significant invasion of privacy that would 
result from the third-party production of such sensitive materials.105  The 
Rule did not, however, protect the plaintiff from the invasion of privacy that 
attended the third-party subpoenas themselves, or that resulted from having 
to oppose the subpoenas.106  Regardless of its ultimate success in obtaining 
the requested materials, a subpoena served on a sexual harassment victim’s 
prior sexual partners seeking sexual videos and photos of the victim may in 
itself constitute an invasion of privacy.107  The plaintiff in Hughes made clear 
in her motion to quash the subpoenas that she viewed the subpoenas as an 
attempt to “humiliate” and “shame” her.108  This type of embarrassment 
could have the effect of deterring victims of sexual harassment from pursuing 
their claims.109  The traumatic impact it had on the plaintiff in Hughes was 
evident in her statement that she felt attacked by Fox News.110  This 
statement reflects the effect that the third-party subpoenas had on the 
plaintiff, even though the subpoenas were ultimately quashed on Rule 412 
grounds, suggesting that Rule 412 did not fully achieve its purpose in 
Hughes.111 
2.  The Weaknesses of New York Common Law 
Because New York State’s civil rape shield jurisprudence derives from 
Rule 412 case law,112 it follows that New York State’s civil rape shield 
common law suffers from shortcomings similar to those of Rule 412.  These 
shortcomings are illustrated in Rivera v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 
The plaintiff in Rivera sued her employer, UPS, for sexual harassment 
under the NYCHRL.113  The plaintiff alleged that her supervisor at UPS 
sexually harassed her by, among other things, stating that the plaintiff 
sexually aroused him and that he wanted to have sex with the plaintiff, 
making comments about the plaintiff’s genitalia, and showing up drunk at 
the plaintiff’s house in the middle of the night on several occasions.114  In 
defense, UPS sought information regarding a consensual sexual relationship 
that the plaintiff had with a UPS employee after the plaintiff’s employment 
with the company had been terminated.115  The apparent purpose of this 
 
 104. Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 58; Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2. 
 105. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 106. See Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Aiken, supra note 10, at 562–63. 
 110. See Steel, supra note 1. 
 111. See Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 58. 
 112. See supra Part I.B. 
 113. Verified Complaint, supra note 52, at 12. 
 114. See id. at 3. 
 115. Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 303092/2008, 2015 WL 13345524, at *3 n.3 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2015), aff’d, 49 N.Y.S.3d 690 (App. Div. 2017). 
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evidence was to blame116 the plaintiff for her supervisor’s alleged conduct 
by showing that the plaintiff was generally welcoming of such conduct.117  
The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a protective order, in part, thereby 
prohibiting UPS from deposing the UPS employee with whom the plaintiff 
had had a consensual sexual relationship.118 
The New York State common law, as derived from federal case law on 
Rule 412,119 successfully protected the plaintiff in Rivera from the significant 
invasion of privacy that would result from responding to inquiries about her 
private sexual relationships and the prejudice that would result from 
admitting such evidence.120  As in Hughes, however, the law did not fully 
protect the plaintiff in Rivera from the invasion of privacy that attended such 
discovery tactics.121  Regardless of the ultimate success in obtaining the 
requested information, an inquiry into a sexual harassment victim’s private 
sexual relationships may in itself constitute an invasion of privacy.122  The 
plaintiff’s counsel in Rivera made clear in the motion for a protective order 
that the plaintiff viewed such discovery tactics as “[an attempt] to smear her 
reputation,” and that the plaintiff found these tactics to be “extremely 
upsetting,” “demean[ing] and humiliat[ing].”123  This type of humiliation 
could have the effect of deterring victims of sexual harassment from pursuing 
their claims.124  In Rivera, this was noted in the plaintiff’s motion for a 
protective order, which stated, “to leave every sexual harassment plaintiff 
vulnerable to an . . . assault on their personal lives in an effort to portray her 
personal life as somehow welcoming sexual harassment, risks chilling all 
sexual harassment victims from complaining.”125  This statement reflects the 
deterrent effect that invasive discovery tactics, such as those used by UPS in 
Rivera, can have on sexual harassment plaintiffs, even when the court 
ultimately rules that the defendant is not entitled to such discovery.  This 
suggests that New York State’s common law does not adequately protect the 
privacy interests of sexual harassment victims. 
 
 116. Affirmation in Support of Order to Show Cause for a Protective Order & in Opposition 
to Defendant’s Motion at 3, Rivera, 2015 WL 13345524 (No. 303092/2008) [hereinafter 
Rivera Affirmation]. 
 117. See id. at 5. 
 118. See Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 49 N.Y.S.3d 690, 692 (App. Div. 2017). 
 119. See supra Part I.B. 
 120. See Rivera, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 692. 
 121. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 122. Rivera Affirmation, supra note 116, at 3–4. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Aiken, supra note 10, at 562–63. 
 125. Rivera Affirmation, supra note 116, at 5. 
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B.  Limiting Civil Rape Shield Laws to Preserve Defendants’ Substantive 
Legal Rights 
Critics of civil rape shield laws have argued that the exclusion of sexual 
history evidence deprives defendants of their substantive legal rights.126  If, 
for example, a defendant is prohibited from presenting evidence to establish 
welcomeness, it will be easier for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case127 
of sexual harassment.128  Because civil rape shield laws do not categorically 
bar defendants from accessing essential evidence, however, they do not 
deprive defendants of their substantive legal rights.129 
Civil rape shield laws do not categorically bar defendants from accessing 
essential evidence but instead ban evidence only when defendants cannot 
show that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the 
danger of harm to the victim or unfair prejudice to any party.130  Because 
civil rape shield laws will allow defendants access to evidence if the 
defendants can make the required showing, civil rape shield laws do not 
deprive defendants of their substantive legal rights.131  This section describes 
two common scenarios in which courts tend to hold that the probative value 
of the evidence sought outweighs the harm to the sexual harassment plaintiff.  
Part II.B.1 discusses the scenario in which the defendant argues that the 
plaintiff welcomed the alleged harassing conduct.  Part II.B.2 discusses the 
scenario in which the plaintiff seeks compensation based on mental anguish.  
Both scenarios exemplify why allowing defendants to delve into certain 
private aspects of an alleged sexual harassment victim’s sexual history is 
sometimes essential to preserve the substantive legal rights of sexual 
harassment defendants. 
1.  Proving Welcomeness 
To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under either Title VII 
or the NYSHRL, plaintiffs must show that they were subject to “unwelcome” 
sexual advances.132  Defense lawyers use this element of a plaintiff’s prima 
facie case to discover and admit evidence regarding the victim’s prior sexual 
behavior in order to show that the victim invited or provoked the alleged 
conduct.133  This is similar to the defense asserted in Hughes.134  There, the 
 
 126. Paul Nicholas Monnin, Special Project, Proving Welcomeness:  The Admissibility of 
Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1183–84 (1995). 
 127. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 128. See Monnin, supra note 126, at 1183–84. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2); Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 3512/07, 2009 WL 
1141401, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009). 
 131. See Monnin, supra note 126, at 1184. 
 132. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-b(2)(a) (McKinney 2020) (“It shall be an unlawful 
discriminatory practice for an employer to . . . engage in unwelcome sexual advances . . . to 
a . . . worker . . . .”); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (noting that 
the “gravamen” of sexual harassment claims is that harassing conduct is unwelcome). 
 133. See Monnin, supra note 126, at 1156. 
 134. See Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 327 F.R.D. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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defendants essentially argued that Mr. Payne’s conduct was not unwelcome 
but rather that the plaintiff had pursued Mr. Payne to advance her career.135  
Where a defendant raises such a defense, the court may have to allow the 
defendant to delve into some aspects of an alleged sexual harassment victim’s 
sexual history or behavior, if necessary to show that the victim actually 
incited or invited the conduct.  In Hughes, for example, although the court 
granted the plaintiff’s motion to quash the third-party subpoenas, the court 
noted that the defendants could seek discovery from the plaintiff, Mr. Payne, 
and others at Fox, instead of obtaining evidence from third parties, to show 
that the plaintiff had used Mr. Payne to advance her career.136  The court 
noted that evidence pertaining to the plaintiff’s sexual history with other men 
was off limits because the prejudice arising from such evidence would 
outweigh what little relevance it would bring to the case.137  However, 
because the plaintiff had acknowledged that rumors that she engaged in “self-
aggrandizing conduct with other men” had “‘long dogged her career,’” the 
defendants could directly depose the plaintiff regarding her reputation for 
engaging in such conduct.138  In addition to highlighting the shortfalls of Rule 
412’s protections,139 therefore, Hughes also exemplifies why defendants 
must sometimes be allowed to delve into certain aspects of an alleged sexual 
harassment victim’s sexual history in order to exercise their substantive legal 
rights and put forth a defense. 
Hughes is something of an exception to the general rule that “evidence of 
the alleged victim’s sexual behavior and/or predisposition in the workplace 
may perhaps be relevant,” whereas “non-workplace conduct will usually be 
irrelevant.”140  In general, “evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct ‘on-duty, 
at the workplace, and with named defendant’ may be discoverable, while 
other evidence, such as non-workplace conduct, is irrelevant and 
inadmissible.”141  This is consistent with the well-settled principle that the 
welcomeness of a sexual advance “does not turn on the private sexual 
behavior of the alleged victim.”142  In the interest of fairness to defendants, 
however, courts will allow discovery of evidence regarding the plaintiff’s 
conduct “on-duty, at the workplace, and with . . . named [d]efendants.”143 
 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 140. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.  But see id. r. 
412(b)(2) (allowing the admission of evidence regarding a victim’s reputation, if the victim 
has placed it in controversy). 
 141. See Chamblee v. Harris & Harris, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 670, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment) 
(collecting cases). 
 142. Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 303092/2008, 2015 WL 13345524, at *3 n.3 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2015) (emphasis added) (citing Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160 
(2d Cir. 2000)), aff’d, 49 N.Y.S.3d 690 (App. Div. 2017). 
 143. Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996). 
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In Wilson v. City of Des Moines,144 for example, the plaintiff sued her 
employer for sexual harassment under Title VII, alleging that her supervisor 
had “subjected her to repeated, vulgar workplace discussions that were 
sexually offensive and that he touched her inappropriately on a number of 
occasions.”145  The court admitted evidence to prove welcomeness—that the 
plaintiff herself had engaged in sexually explicit language and conduct in the 
workplace, including talking about vibrators and men’s sex organs.146  In 
allowing the evidence, the court reasoned that, although “an alleged victim’s 
private sexual behavior does not change her expectations about her work 
environment,” the “evidence of an alleged victim’s particular behavior in the 
workplace may be probative of welcomeness.”147 
2.  Damages Based on Mental Anguish 
Sexual harassment plaintiffs often seek compensation for emotional 
distress as part of their claims for damages.148  In order to preserve 
defendants’ legal rights in such cases, courts will often permit some inquiry 
by defendants into the private sexual histories of these plaintiffs.149  In 
allowing this inquiry, courts have noted that discovery of a plaintiff’s 
personal sexual history may be an intrusion of privacy and may deter some 
plaintiffs from proceeding with their claims, but this inquiry may be 
warranted where a plaintiff seeks compensation for mental anguish.150  The 
rationale for allowing this inquiry is that it would be unfair to permit a 
plaintiff claiming emotional distress to block discovery of evidence that may 
show whether (1) “any emotional distress actually was suffered,” (2) “any 
emotional distress that did occur had a serious impact on the plaintiff’s life,” 
and (3) “any emotional distress was attributable, either in whole or in part, to 
circumstances other than the alleged conduct of the defendant.”151  In other 
words, where a plaintiff seeks to prove that he or she suffered emotional 
distress as a result of the sexual harassment, the defendant has a right to show 
that the plaintiff’s emotional distress was caused, at least in part, by other 
events or circumstances.152 
In Zakrzewska v. New School,153 for example, the plaintiff brought a sexual 
harassment claim under NYCHRL against her employer, a university, 
 
 144. 442 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 145. Id. at 640. 
 146. See id. at 639, 643. 
 147. See id. at 643. 
 148. See, e.g., Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No. 06 Civ. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL 126594, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008); Barta, 169 F.R.D. at 133; Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 
3512/07, 2009 WL 1141401, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009); Affirmation of Richard J. 
Rabin at 2, Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 303092/2008, 2015 WL 13345524 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2015). 
 149. See, e.g., Zakrzewska, 2008 WL 126594, at *1; Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
No. 303092/2008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2009) (discovery order). 
 150. See Zakrzewska, 2008 WL 126594, at *2. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. 928 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 2010). 
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alleging that her supervisor “subjected her to sexually harassing e-mails and 
conduct.”154  The only damages that the plaintiff sought were for emotional 
distress on the grounds that her supervisor’s alleged unwanted advances 
changed the “plaintiff’s life markedly for the worse and seriously debilitated 
her for a substantial period of time.”155  The plaintiff claimed that, as a result 
of the alleged sexual harassment, she “lost interest in going out and 
participating in social activities” and “experienced difficulty trusting 
men.”156  The defendants sought to discover entries from the plaintiff’s diary 
from the period during which the sexual harassment allegedly took place.157  
In support of their discovery demands, the defendants argued that the diaries 
were discoverable because of the likelihood that the diaries contained 
evidence pertaining to the plaintiff’s claims regarding the impact that the 
alleged harassment had on her quality of life.158  Specifically, the defendants 
argued that the diaries may have contained evidence (1) of intimate 
relationships in which the plaintiff “divulged the sources of any emotional 
turmoil she claims to have suffered,” (2) that the plaintiff responded to an 
internet advertisement that sought sex with a “non-pro” in return for 
payment, and (3) that the plaintiff engaged in electronic communications 
with an unidentified male in which the plaintiff arguably offered to engage 
in sex with a stranger in exchange for a meal in a “nice and glamorous” 
restaurant.159  Such information, the defendants argued, would refute the 
plaintiff’s claims.160  The plaintiff argued that discovery of her diaries should 
be barred pursuant to Rule 412.161  While the court noted that “[i]ndividuals’ 
privacy interests in such circumstances are important and deserving of 
protection” and that “there is a risk that permitting such discovery would 
deter some individuals from pursuing meritorious claims,” the court 
ultimately allowed the discovery in the interest of fairness to the 
defendants.162  The court reasoned that, where a plaintiff seeks to prove that 
he or she suffered emotional distress as a result of the sexual harassment, the 
defense has a right to inquire into the plaintiff’s private sexual conduct in 
order to show that the plaintiff’s emotional distress was caused, at least in 
part, by other events and circumstances.163 
Similarly, in Rivera, the plaintiff evidently sought six million dollars in 
damages for pain and suffering that allegedly resulted from having been 
sexually harassed by her supervisor.164  In defending the claim, UPS sought 
documents and information related to the plaintiff’s marital troubles and 
experiences with domestic violence on the grounds that such discovery was 
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 161. See id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment). 
 162. See id. at *2. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Affirmation of Richard J. Rabin, supra note 148, at 3. 
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necessary to ascertain other causes of the plaintiff’s alleged pain and 
suffering.165  The court denied the part of the plaintiff’s motion that sought 
to preclude such discovery and ordered that the plaintiff produce information 
regarding domestic violence matters between the plaintiff and her 
husband.166 
C.  How the NYSHRL Reforms May Exacerbate the Conflict Between the 
Interests of Plaintiffs and Defendants 
Because the reformed NYSHRL weakened two commonly used defenses 
in sexual harassment cases, the “severe or pervasive” standard and the 
Faragher-Ellerth defense, sexual harassment defendants will have to turn to 
alternative means of defending against sexual harassment claims brought 
under the NYSHRL with greater frequency.167  Two defenses that remain 
available to sexual harassment defendants under the revised NYSHRL, 
which may be relied on more heavily by sexual harassment defendants in the 
wake of the NYSHRL reforms, include proving welcomeness and 
challenging damages based on mental anguish.168  Part II.C.1 and Part II.C.2 
discuss how these defenses may result in a greater intrusion of a sexual 
harassment plaintiff’s privacy relative to the severe or pervasive standard and 
the Faragher-Ellerth defense, respectively. 
Given the expected increase in privacy intrusions flowing from the 
elimination of the severe or pervasive standard and the Faragher-Ellerth 
defense, one would likewise expect to see an increase in litigation over the 
discovery and admissibility of sexual harassment plaintiffs’ sexual history 
evidence.  However, NYCHRL eliminated the “severe or pervasive” standard 
and the Faragher-Ellerth defense in 2009169 and 2010170 respectively, and 
there has been no apparent increase in litigation over the discovery and 
admissibility of sexual harassment plaintiffs’ sexual history evidence under 
the NYCHRL.  Part II.C.3 concludes by discussing why the NYCHRL has 
not seen an increase in such litigation and why the same may not hold true 
under the revised NYSHRL. 
1.  The Severe or Pervasive Standard:  High Bar, Low Intrusion 
Prior to the NYSHRL reforms, the application of the “severe or pervasive” 
standard to sexual harassment claims under the NYSHRL made it relatively 
easy for defendants to dispose of sexual harassment claims.171  The assertion 
that the conduct in question was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain 
a plaintiff’s claim did not require an inquiry into the plaintiff’s prior sexual 
 
 165. See id. at 6, 8. 
 166. Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 303092/2008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2009) 
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 167. See supra Part I.C. 
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 170. See Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 928 N.E. 2d 1035, 1036 (N.Y. 2010). 
 171. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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history or behavior.172  Instead, defendants could assert the defense that the 
conduct at issue was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a sexual 
harassment claim merely by comparing the conduct at issue to conduct that 
the court had held to be insufficiently severe or pervasive in prior cases.173 
Because the NYSHRL reforms eliminated the “severe or pervasive” 
requirement and made a broader range of conduct actionable under the 
revised NYSHRL, it will be more difficult for defendants to dispose of sexual 
harassment claims by merely showing that the conduct at issue does not fall 
within the universe of what the court considers actionable conduct.174  As a 
result, defendants may instead have to turn to other defenses to dispose of or 
mitigate sexual harassment claims, such as proving that the conduct at issue 
was welcomed by the plaintiff or, where the plaintiff claims damages based 
on mental anguish, that the plaintiff’s emotional distress was caused at least 
in part by other events and circumstances.  Both of these defenses may 
require the defendant to seek evidence regarding the private sexual history of 
the plaintiff that would not be necessary to support a defense based on the 
“severe or pervasive” standard.175 
2.  The Faragher-Ellerth Defense:  No Liability, No Intrusion 
Prior to the NYSHRL reforms, the applicability of the Faragher-Ellerth 
defense to sexual harassment claims under the NYSHRL enabled an 
employer to avoid vicarious liability in certain circumstances if the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually 
harassing conduct, and the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of the corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to 
otherwise avoid harm.176  The assertion that the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing 
conduct did not require an inquiry into the sexual history or behavior of the 
plaintiff.177  Similarly, the assertion that the plaintiff-employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of the corrective opportunities provided by the 
 
 172. Note, however, that New York followed Title VII jurisprudence in requiring the 
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employer, or to otherwise avoid harm, did not require an inquiry into the 
sexual history or behavior of the plaintiff.178 
Because the Faragher-Ellerth defense will “not be determinative” of the 
employer’s liability under the revised NYSHRL,179  employers will not be 
able to dispose of sexual harassment claims under the revised NYSHRL by 
merely showing that the plaintiff failed to take advantage of the corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer.  Instead, employers may have to turn 
to other defenses to dispose of or mitigate sexual harassment claims, such as 
proving that the conduct at issue was welcomed by the plaintiff or, where the 
plaintiff claims damages based on mental anguish, that the emotional distress 
was caused at least in part by other events and circumstances.  Both of these 
defenses may require the defendant to seek evidence regarding the private 
sexual history of the plaintiff that would not be necessary to support a defense 
were the Faragher-Ellerth defense still available.180 
3.  Comparison to the NYCHRL 
One factor that might explain why there has been no apparent increase in 
litigation over the admissibility of plaintiffs’ sexual histories under the 
NYCHRL is the availability of mandatory, confidential arbitration or 
prelitigation settlements under the NYCHRL.181  Scholars have noted that 
these forms of alternative dispute resolution have led to a “shuttling of claims 
out of the public court system.”182  For example, Fox News, which is 
headquartered in New York and subject to the NYCHRL, paid millions of 
dollars to settle harassment claims against Bill O’Reilly.183  The majority of 
these claims were not filed in court.184  This “shuttling”185 may explain why 
there has not been an increase in litigation over the discovery and 
admissibility of evidence relating to the sexual histories of sexual harassment 
plaintiffs under the NYCHRL. 
The NYSHRL reforms, however, prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses 
with respect to claims of discrimination.186  This may reduce the frequency 
with which claims are shuttled out of the public court system.  Consequently, 
the missing increase in litigation over the discovery and admissibility of 
evidence relating to the sexual histories of sexual harassment plaintiffs may 
materialize under the revised NYSHRL.  That said, the NYSHRL reforms’ 
prohibition of mandatory arbitration clauses may be preempted by the 
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 181. See Nuñez, supra note 86, at 506. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See Assemb. 08421, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted).  Note that the 
NYSHRL reforms expressly make sexual harassment a form of discrimination. Id. 
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Federal Arbitration Act.187  If the NYSHRL reforms’ prohibition of 
mandatory arbitration clauses is not enforceable, then sexual harassment 
claims may continue to be settled or arbitrated out of court. Thus, the 
predicted increase in litigation over the discovery and admissibility of 
evidence relating to the sexual histories of sexual harassment plaintiffs may 
not materialize under the revised NYSHRL. 
III.  HOW NEW YORK CAN ENCOURAGE SEXUAL HARASSMENT VICTIMS TO 
COME FORWARD BY ENACTING ITS OWN CIVIL RAPE SHIELD STATUTE 
A primary aim of the NYSHRL reforms is to make it “easier for workplace 
sexual harassment claims to be brought forward.”188  This aim is congruous 
with that of Rule 412, which seeks to protect alleged victims of sexual 
misconduct from an “invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and 
sexual stereotyping” and to encourage “victims of sexual misconduct to 
institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.”189  
Reconciling these objectives with the needs of defendants to delve into 
certain aspects of victims’ sexual histories in order to put forth a defense may 
be an impossible task.  Some of the shortcomings of current civil rape shield 
laws can be addressed, however, to provide more protections to sexual 
harassment victims without impinging on defendants’ substantive legal 
rights.  This Part proposes that to further the goals of the NYSHRL reforms, 
New York State should enact its own civil rape shield statute that eliminates 
some of the gaps that plague Rule 412 and New York’s civil rape shield 
common law.  Part III.A explains why New York can depart from Rule 412 
case law.  Part III.B discusses why enacting a civil rape shield statute is the 
best way to increase the protections of plaintiffs without depriving 
defendants of substantive legal rights.  Part III.C then discusses the specific 
provisions that this Note proposes should be included in New York’s civil 
rape shield statute. 
A.  Why New York Need Not Apply Rule 412 in Civil Cases 
The New York State Legislature has signaled its intention to diverge from 
federal civil rights laws by expressly stating in the revised NYSHRL that “the 
provisions of this article shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment 
of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights 
laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the 
provisions of this article, have been so construed.”190 
 
 187. See Penzer, supra note 62.  In Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the court held that a 
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Given this divergence from federal law, New York can likewise diverge 
from federal Rule 412 precedent if the Rule does not sufficiently aid in the 
accomplishment of the remedial purpose of the revised NYSHRL.  A New 
York State civil rape shield statute would govern sexual harassment claims 
filed in state courts. 
Because the NYSHRL reforms have caused the NYSHRL to differ from 
Title VII in several ways,191 plaintiffs can bring claims under the revised 
NYSHRL that cannot be brought under Title VII.  Specifically, a plaintiff 
may have an actionable sexual harassment claim under NYSHRL for 
harassing conduct that would not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
sustain a claim under Title VII.192  Similarly, while a plaintiff cannot sue an 
employer for sexual harassment under Title VII if that employer has fewer 
than fifteen employees, that plaintiff will be able to sue that employer under 
NYSHRL because the revised NYSHRL applies to employers regardless of 
size.193  For these reasons, a plaintiff may bring a sexual harassment claim in 
New York State court that cannot be brought in federal court.  Consequently, 
in litigating such claims, Rule 412 need not apply, and the New York State 
courts could instead apply a New York State civil rape shield law, if the 
legislature were to enact one. 
B.  Why a State Civil Rape Shield Statute Is the Best Solution 
A New York civil rape shield statute is not the only possible solution to 
closing the gaps in current civil rape shield laws without infringing on 
defendants’ substantive legal rights.  New York currently follows federal 
Rule 412 precedent.  Both Rule 412 and New York’s civil rape shield 
common law suffer from the same shortcomings.194  One solution to these 
shortcomings, therefore, might be to amend Rule 412.  However, amending 
the Federal Rules of Evidence is a difficult endeavor.195  Therefore, enacting 
a state civil rape shield statute is the superior solution. 
The enactment of a civil rape shield statute is also a superior solution 
relative to waiting for New York’s common law to further develop.  With 
little state law precedent, the state courts have been forced to turn to federal 
Rule 412 case law for guidance.196  However, given the New York State 
Legislature’s intention to diverge from federal civil rights laws,197 it makes 
little sense to wait for a rule to develop through federal cases concerning Title 
VII.  To give the NYSHRL reforms full effect, therefore, this Note proposes 
that the New York State Legislature should enact a civil rape shield statute. 
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C.  How a New York Civil Rape Shield Statute Can Better Protect Sexual 
Harassment Plaintiffs Without Stepping on Defendants’ Rights 
New York can enact a civil rape shield law that provides more effective 
procedural safeguards and enforcement mechanisms than those of Rule 412 
without impinging on the rights of defendants to a fair trial.  Part III.C.1 
discusses how New York can improve the procedures of Rule 412 by making 
sexual history evidence presumptively inadmissible regardless of purpose.  
Part III.C.2 discusses how New York can adapt the procedures of Rule 412 
so that they apply to defendants seeking to discover evidence, in addition to 
defendants seeking the admission of evidence.  Finally, Part III.C.3 discusses 
how New York can expressly provide for sanctions against defendants who 
do not comply with the proposed procedural safeguards. 
1.  Making Sexual History Evidence Presumptively Inadmissible 
Regardless of Purpose 
Rule 412 includes specific procedures that are designed to “assure that the 
privacy of the alleged victim is preserved in all cases in which the court rules 
that proffered evidence is not admissible.”198  Under these procedures, a 
party seeking to offer evidence subject to Rule 412 is required to “file a 
motion that specifically describes the evidence and states the purpose for 
which it is to be offered.”199  Before the court may admit the evidence, it 
must conduct an in camera hearing, during which the victim and parties have 
a right to attend and be heard.200  This motion, as well as any related materials 
and the record of the hearing, must be sealed unless the court orders 
otherwise.201  These procedural requirements prevent a defendant from filing 
a motion, which describes the evidence it seeks to introduce in detail, such 
that these private materials automatically become a matter of public 
record.202  Once part of the public record, anyone can obtain and/or 
disseminate the private contents of those materials and invade a plaintiff’s 
privacy before the court has had the opportunity to determine whether the 
evidence is admissible.203  Entering such intimate details into the public 
record may deter victims from coming forward with sexual harassment 
claims.204  The Rule 412 procedures do not impinge on the defendant’s 
ability to raise a defense but merely protect the alleged victim’s privacy as 
the court determines whether the evidence sought is admissible. 
The Rule 412 procedures are not completely effective in protecting the 
alleged victim’s privacy, however.  In Hughes, for example, despite the Rule 
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412 procedures, the plaintiff’s affairs with four men became a part of the 
public record even though the court ultimately ruled that Rule 412 barred the 
defendants from subpoenaing the four men for information related to those 
affairs.205 
The inadequacy of the Rule 412 procedures in protecting the alleged 
victim’s privacy is partially attributable to the text of the rule.  Rule 412 
prohibits the use of evidence (1) “offered to prove that a victim engaged in 
other sexual behavior” or (2) “offered to prove a victim’s sexual 
predisposition.”206  Although the purpose of this Rule is to encourage 
“victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal 
proceedings against alleged offenders,”207 the narrow wording of the text 
limits the ability of the rule to fully achieve its purpose.  Because the text 
prohibits evidence based on what it is being “offered to prove,” many 
defendants argue that evidence pertaining to a victim’s sexual behavior or 
predisposition is admissible if it is offered to prove something else.208  In 
Hughes, for example, the defendants arguably did not seek evidence 
pertaining to the plaintiff’s romantic affairs to prove that the plaintiff engaged 
in other sexual behavior or to prove the plaintiff’s sexual predisposition.209  
Instead, the defendants sought evidence pertaining to the plaintiff’s romantic 
affairs to prove that the plaintiff had actually pursued her alleged sexual 
harasser in order to advance her career.210  Under Rule 412, if the evidence 
is not being offered to prove that the victim engaged in other sexual behavior 
or to prove the victim’s sexual predisposition, but is instead offered to prove 
something else, such as welcomeness or damages, it is not obvious that the 
evidence is subject to Rule 412 at all.211  It is, therefore, not apparent that the 
Rule 412 procedures apply, and the defendant might not take the necessary 
steps to prevent sensitive materials from automatically becoming a matter of 
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public record before the court even determines whether the evidence is 
admissible in the first place.212 
This Note proposes that New York should enact a civil rape shield statute 
that makes sexual history evidence presumptively inadmissible regardless of 
what the evidence is being offered to prove.  The statute can achieve this by 
adopting language similar to Rule 412, but dropping the words “offered to 
prove” such that all evidence regarding a victim’s sexual behavior or 
predisposition is presumptively inadmissible, regardless of the reason that 
the defendants are seeking to introduce such evidence.  Then, by 
incorporating the Rule 412 procedures, there will be little doubt that when 
defendants seek evidence pertaining to a plaintiff’s sexual behavior or 
predisposition, the defendants must take steps to ensure that such evidence 
does not become a part of the public record before the court determines 
whether the evidence is admissible. 
2.  Extending the Rule 412 Procedures from Admissibility to Discovery 
The Rule 412 procedures “do not apply to discovery of a victim’s past 
sexual conduct or predisposition in civil cases.”213  Instead, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26 governs the procedures in such cases and “courts should 
enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to protect the victim 
against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality.”214  Rule 26 
provides that “any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a 
protective order in the court where the action is pending.”215  Thus, while a 
sexual harassment defendant has an affirmative obligation to file a motion 
under seal when seeking to admit evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual history,216 
the obligation is on the sexual harassment plaintiff to request a protective 
order when the defendant is seeking to discover, rather than admit such 
evidence.217  As a result, intimate details of the private lives of civil plaintiffs 
in sexual harassment cases are frequently made public when a defendant is 
seeking the discovery, rather than the admission, of such evidence.  This was 
the case in Hughes, where the plaintiff’s extramarital affairs became a part 
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of the public record, even though the court ultimately ruled that Rule 412 
barred the defendants from subpoenaing the four men for information related 
to those affairs.218  Zakrzewska is similarly illustrative.219  There, the 
defendants sought to discover portions of the plaintiff’s diary and the plaintiff 
moved for a protective order pursuant to Rule 412 and Rule 26.220  In 
opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for a protective order, the defendants 
revealed intimate details about the plaintiff’s sexual relations with third 
parties.221  Although the court ultimately ruled that the diary entries were 
discoverable,222 details about the plaintiff’s sexual relations with third parties 
became a part of the public record before the court ruled on the 
discoverability of the evidence. 
The likely publicity of such intimate details may deter victims from 
coming forward with sexual harassment claims,223 which undermines the 
purpose of the NYSHRL reforms to make it “easier for workplace sexual 
harassment claims to be brought forward.”224 
This Note proposes that New York should enact a civil rape shield law that 
expressly incorporates the Rule 412 procedures any time a party seeks to 
discover evidence regarding the victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition in 
civil cases.  By applying these procedures to the discovery of evidence 
pertaining to an alleged sexual harassment victim’s sexual history, in 
addition to the admission of such evidence, the legislature can increase the 
protections afforded to sexual harassment victims without impinging on the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.  These procedures will have no impact on the 
defendant’s ability to discover potentially critical evidence, but they will 
prevent intimate details about the victim’s private life from becoming a part 
of the public record, in the event that the discovery does not lead to 
admissible evidence. 
3.  Sanctions 
This Note proposes that New York should enact a civil rape shield law that 
also explicitly provides for sanctions against a party or attorney who fails to 
follow the protective procedures described in Parts III.C.1 and III.C.2.  In 
order to be effective, the protective procedures must be accompanied by an 
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enforcement mechanism.225  Sanctions that punish defendants for violating 
the protective procedures can serve as such an enforcement mechanism.226 
In Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co.,227 for example, the court 
sanctioned the defendant for “its callous disregard of the procedural 
safeguards articulated in Rule 412(c)” where the defendant filed a motion 
regarding sensitive information about the plaintiff without requesting that the 
motion be filed under seal.228  The defendant sought to introduce evidence 
that the plaintiff, an alleged victim of sexual harassment, had frequently 
participated in sexually provocative discussions and activities in the 
workplace to show that the plaintiff welcomed her alleged harasser’s sexually 
suggestive behavior.229  Because the defendant did not follow the Rule 412 
procedures, however, the court sanctioned the defendant by excluding all 
testimony regarding the plaintiff’s alleged participation in sexually 
provocative discussions and activities in the workplace, other than the 
testimony of the plaintiff’s alleged harasser.230  By allowing the alleged 
harasser’s testimony on this issue, the court noted that the defendant would 
not be deprived of a fair trial.231  By excluding evidence that might be 
relevant to the defendant’s defense, however, the court was able to punish 
the defendant for violating the Rule 412 procedures.232 
Where the court cannot exclude evidence as a sanction for a defendants’ 
failure to comply with the protective procedures described in Parts III.C.1 
and III.C.2 without depriving the defendant of a fair trial, the court may 
instead issue a fine as the appropriate sanction.233 
CONCLUSION 
By eliminating the “severe or pervasive” standard and the Faragher-
Ellerth defense, the NYSHRL reforms may have increased the frequency 
with which defendants turn to defenses that threaten plaintiffs’ privacy.  This 
may consequently deter victims of sexual harassment from coming forward.  
Such a deterrent effect undermines the purposes of the NYSHRL reforms, 
which sought to make it easier for victims of sexual harassment to bring 
claims.  New York’s current rape shield jurisprudence does not sufficiently 
protect sexual harassment plaintiffs in order to counteract this deterrent 
effect.  The state should enact a civil rape shield statute that better protects 
sexual harassment plaintiffs without further limiting defendants’ ability to 
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defend against sexual harassment charges.  Such a statute should (1) make 
sexual history evidence presumptively inadmissible regardless of what it is 
being offered to prove, (2) include protective procedures that apply to both 
the admissibility and discovery of sexual history evidence, and (3) expressly 
provide for sanctions against defendants who fail to comply with the statute. 
